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forbids a discussion of them here. Almost every current question : cotton speculations, fraud in army contracts, political influence and bargain, emancipation, negro soldiers, and many another, is touched on briefly and incidentally. A fact is stated, an observation recorded or an opinion stated which will be of great value in the hands of the historian who shall make a comprehensive study of the subject to which it relates.

The professional historian who turns to Mr. Dana's book for historical material will be guilty of negligence if he does not also consult the dispatches themselves in the *Record*. But in the *Recollections* he will find much that cannot be obtained elsewhere. First there are some letters hitherto unpublished. Then there is the setting of the recorded events as Mr. Dana has been able to recall it and there are his own interpretations which but for this book would have died with him. The general reader's interest will be held by the perspicuous descriptions of several great campaigns, by the numerous character-sketches and by many passages of a high order of literary merit.

FREDERICK W. MOORE.

Life of Oliver P. Morton, including his important Speeches. By WILLIAM DUDLEY FOULKE. (Indianapolis, Kansas City : The Bowen-Merrill Co. 1898. Two vols., pp. 488, 593.)

In any list of a dozen men most prominent in civil life during the civil war period, Oliver P. Morton's name would pretty surely be found. He did not neglect the politician's art of keeping himself in the public eye, and whatever he did was industriously advertised by as compact and well disciplined a following as any public man could boast. Yet nobody questioned his possession of qualities which justified his prominence. Chief of these was a natural force of will which either dominated those about him and made them willing followers, or drove them into antagonism. He had the courage of a revolutionist which stuck at nothing to reach his object, and made his life a continued illustration of the proverb that "the end justifies the means." His intellect, like his body in his prime, was robust and burly. His speech was direct and clear, and he had a natural dialectical power in referring his conduct and the policy he advocated to principles and to passions that were in vogue. It was inevitable that he should be a popular leader in a troubled time. Whether he were an able demagogue or a statesman was and is the question. His biographer has given us a book which will help the historian, for it is a fair presentation of the acts and events of Morton's life, without overstraining to force them into consistency or to justify them. It shows the conventional desire of one who represents family and local pride to exalt the motives, to soften hard facts, to suggest apologies ; but this is done with moderation and intelligent restraint, as well as with good literary judgment.

Morton threw himself into the movement which was organized into the Republican party, when Douglas's Kansas-Nebraska bill and the Dred

Scott decision forced the issue whether the free states should surrender their right under the Missouri Compromise to the exclusive colonizing of the great North-west. He had been a Democrat, and though comparatively young, his native characteristics made him aggressive and militant; so that when they were used against his old political associates, the resulting antagonism was sharp. He was soon well hated. The same qualities and the zeal with which he espoused his new cause made him a leader in it from the start. He signalized his advent to prominence by suggesting to the Republican majority of the Indiana Senate a "device" by which they could get rid of a Democratic member whose right to a seat was contested. The Republicans of the Senate refused to accompany the Democrats to the joint convention of the two houses to elect a Senator in Congress; but though a majority, they were not enough to make the legal quorum. Morton instructed them that when the Democratic senators were absent, they could put one of their own number in the chair, oust the objectionable member, fill his place, and by doing this without roll-call there could be no proof that a lawful quorum was not present and no means of undoing it. A confessed illegality would thus be successful. It was done accordingly, and worked like a charm. Morton's prestige in Indiana was solidified.

"Bolting" to break a quorum had become in that state a common practice, each party practising it in turn, and each in turn denouncing it as revolutionary, which, of course, it was. As parties get used to doing what they condemn in their opponents, and make it their creed that it is right to "do evil that good may come," the obscuration of the moral sense surely follows; and from bolting to defeat a "gerrymander" as the Democrats did in March, 1862, or to defeat Hendricks's election to the national Senate as the Republicans did in January, 1863, to "doctoring" election returns, or "voting 'em in blocks of five," is a *facilis descensus* which helps to make some periods of Indiana politics intelligible. Certainly it explains why the order of "Sons of Liberty" flourished more in that state than elsewhere.

Morton's term as governor of his state was for four years from January, 1861. The reaction of 1862 made the legislature Democratic for 1863-64. A bill was introduced intended to curtail the power of the governor in the organization of the militia and in the expenditure of funds appropriated for the relief of sick soldiers. The biographer tells us that the bill "showed a rather adroit compliance with the letter of the constitution while its spirit was subverted." Before the bill had passed either house, after a vote which seemed to show that it would pass that in which it originated, the Republicans, under Morton's avowed leadership, "bolted" again and broke up the quorum. The session ended without their return, all legislation was blocked, and the appropriations for ordinary expenditures of the state government were not made. Morton personally assumed the whole administration. He borrowed money from the county treasuries in Republican counties, borrowed a large sum from the Secretary of War, borrowed from bankers. He established a private

treasury and auditing office, paid the interest on the state debt, the running expenses of asylums and sanitary commission and other public expenditures, refused to call an extra session of the legislature, and in the language of his biographer, "was the State" until a new election gave him friendly support again in the co-ordinate department of the government.

He was a dictator confessed. There was hardly a pretense of disguise. It was not only revolution, but there was no such peril as to make an excuse for it. The bill had not passed one house. It must pass both, and still again after he should veto it. He had promises from moderate Democrats that it should not finally pass. There was time enough to "bolt" when it came to a vote after a veto. But if it had passed it does not seem to have been terrible in its character. Annoying, even personally exasperating no doubt it was; but he could have been relied on to find lawful means of extracting its sting. The militia was not the volunteer army. This was controlled by Federal law. His appointment of officers of volunteers could not be meddled with. United States troops garrisoned the state under United States officers selected by himself. Mr. Stanton treated him as an *alter ego*. All local militia laws might have been repealed and neither state nor country would have known the difference. The historian will have to conclude that the question was one of personal pride and dignity: the action both revolutionary and precipitate. It is only by noting these characteristics of his administration in Indiana that we can understand him in his rôle of leader in reconstruction measures in the national Senate, when he had taken his seat in that body.

At the close of the war, in the autumn canvass of 1865, Morton had treated with fulness the subject of the political status of the freedmen in the South after the abolition of slavery. He had said "that however freely we may admit the natural rights of the negro, colored state governments are not desirable; that finally they will bring about a war of races . . . I would give these men, just emerged from slavery, a period of probation; I would give them time to acquire a little property, and get a little education; time to learn something about the simplest forms of business, and to prepare themselves for the exercise of political power. At the end of ten, fifteen or twenty years, let them come into the enjoyment of their political rights." This theme was enlarged upon, and we are told that "President Johnson said it was the ablest defense of his policy yet made public."

Stickling for mere formal consistency we may not ask of a public man more than of a private one. But we study with interest the reasons a public man gives for a change of attitude. By 1867 Morton had given his adhesion to the policy of which Thaddeus Stevens was the champion in Congress, and in his last message to the Indiana legislature, a few days before he was elected to the Senate, he reiterated the objections to making a governing class of a race "impressed with that character which slavery impresses on its victims," and said it "would be justified only by necessity resulting from inability to maintain loyal republican state

governments in any other way." When this came later into the fiery analysis of the debates on the final reconstruction measures, it was seen that "republican" meant "Republican party."

It was, indeed, a trying situation for the leaders who had controlled the politics of the country through the war, when they found that peace and the return of the rebellious states to allegiance threatened to put the opposition into power. It was not strange that many of them lost the self-control necessary to judge reasonably what kind of government in those states was possible or tolerable, and in the stress of party conflict forgot the lessons of history and of social science. The methods which were adopted led inevitably to arraying the races solidly against each other in political struggle. It needed no gift of prophecy to tell the outcome of this.

Morton soon became chairman of the Committee on Privileges and Elections and absorbed into that committee the control of Reconstruction legislation. He introduced the amendment to the Reconstruction laws already complied with, by which as a further condition of admission, Virginia, Mississippi and Texas were required to adopt the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment. These votes were thought necessary to pass it, in view of the opposition to it in Northern states. The Indiana senator formulated his doctrine that "definitions advance" and that "a republican government" might mean a different thing in one year from another.

Space will not permit the consideration of intermediate steps, and we must hasten to the events which showed the self-destructive development of Morton's system. In the Louisiana election of 1872, two contesting "returning boards" claimed the authority to decide the result. The "Republican" board had no returns, the "Liberal" had the returns and declared McEnery elected Governor. The Republican board declared Kellogg elected, and sent one of their number to Washington to inform Congress that they did not claim to have evidence of Kellogg's election, but in view of the general intimidation of the negroes, they had given a formal certificate to Kellogg for the purpose of asking Congress to set aside the whole election and order another under General Sheridan's protection.¹ It seemed that Congress generally favored doing this and a majority of Morton's own committee so reported. But Morton opposed it vehemently and carried his point. The administration had been induced to install Kellogg by military force pending Congressional action, and basing his course on a convenient form of the argument in favor of a *de facto* government, he waived aside the notice from the returning board itself that they had canvassed no returns, and added to the doctrine that "the end justifies the means," the gloss, "keep all you've got." He thus invented the improvement on the returning board of the South, by which without returns, or with those manufactured to its order, it could insure the success of the proper candidate. It only needed the device of "not to go behind the returns" to make it a theoretically per-

¹ See *The Nation*, December 17, 1896, p. 459.

fect instrument of government. In practice it was marred by inconsistencies in his fellow senators which disgusted Morton. They accepted its work in giving Louisiana Kellogg as governor, but they drew the line when it sent Pinchback to sit with them in the Senate chamber.

The full fruition of the system came later. The men having scruples left the returning board. Their successors refused to fill a vacancy in it which the law required to be filled by one of their political opponents, and the last check upon their actions was removed. On the other side the general intimidation of the freedmen had gone so far that it was not necessary to have any violence or threats at the polls on election day. The presence of the usual party ticket-holders, checking off the voters, was enough. The necessity arose for going behind the actual election, if not behind the returns. Could an outwardly peaceable election in a precinct be set aside, and the candidate who had a minority of votes be declared elected, on the ground that the black voters had been terrorized last week or last year? The one-party board was equal to the occasion. It could exclude such precincts as it pleased, having no troublesome minority present to ask impertinent questions, or make awkward protests. Its tools afterward confessed, but one who confesses a fraud is not a very credible witness, though all courts listen to him.

A gradual conviction spread through the country that the system could not work. Committees of Congress were sent south and said much more when they came back than appeared in their official reports. In "letting it go this time," they emphasized the absolute necessity of change. Then, the Louisiana returning board was a self-perpetuating one, and there was Sheridan's word for it that its leader was a rascal. It could go on making its legislatures as well as executive officers, forever, whatever votes were actually cast. We were getting to what the French call an *impasse*. All this, scarcely veiled, appears in the biography before us.

In the counting of the electoral votes of 1876, Morton was a model of boldness and directness in his advocacy of "thorough." He applied his former invention in all its completeness. Having a Democratic House of Representatives to deal with, he had led the Senate to abrogate the 22d joint rule adopted by his party in 1865 to give each house a veto on counting the contested vote of a state. He carried logic "to the limit" (in the mathematical sense). There must be no going behind the returns. If the returning board has certified a given list of electors and the electors have sent a vote, that vote must be counted, and the President *pro tem.* of the Senate must count it. Senator Ferry, the presiding officer, was a man of delicate temperament, quite a contrast to the Indiana senator in nearly every physical and mental quality, and Morton spoke and acted as if his end was gained if he made Ferry's counting the means. There were those who knew both men who doubted whether disappointment would not have been in store for him. But he had strained his leadership too far. The Senate refused to go with him and agreed to the Electoral Commission bill, which gave to Hayes' election the sanction of a decision by a legally constituted tribunal.

How far unofficial negotiations went is not known, but the fact was that the decision was followed by Grant's withholding military interference in the organization of the Louisiana government, and the "government *de facto*" was not that certified by the returning board. To declare that the other was still the "government *de jure*" seemed a strain upon any conscience, but Morton did not falter. Then, Hayes sent commissions to negotiate a settlement in Louisiana and South Carolina, and the dissolution of the so-called Republican legislatures followed. The plan of reconstruction and perpetuation of party domination under Morton's doctrine of the right of Congress "to raise up a new loyal voting population" had failed. Ten years' struggle had left the races as hostile as ever. What had been done toward lifting the freedmen into capacity for self-government under the fostering power of the nation used in the cause of humanity and freedom? Had the adopted plan ever a chance of success? Was it intelligently adapted to the solution of the great problem? Had the end been feasible and the means honest? Was it statesmanship? The final reputation of Morton is involved in the answer. Many incidents of his career and other questions of public policy which he debated would repay examination; but the matters above discussed are, after all, those which must determine his character as a public man.

Historic Towns of New England. Edited by LYMAN P. POWELL.
(New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1898. Pp. xxi, 599.)

THIS book, as explained by the editor in his preface, is partly the product of a tour undertaken by a party starting from Philadelphia at the close of the University Extension Summer Meeting in 1894, for "a ten days' pilgrimage in the footsteps of George Washington." But as Washington never visited half the places described in it, the book is seen to be both more and less than was originally planned for—more, because many of the towns spoken of were not included in the pilgrimage, and less, because the places outside of New England which were visited by Washington and by these pilgrims are not included in this work, but are left for a possible future publication on *Historic Towns of the Middle States*.

About one-half of the book consists apparently of the addresses made to the travelling party at the places actually visited; and the other half includes valuable descriptions, by different authors, of other towns, which have been added in order to give a larger representation of what New England has been in history. It would seem as if one who assumes to be the editor of such a work should at least have written the introduction. It is difficult to see what "editing" has been done, except to solicit the manuscripts and perhaps to select some of the illustrations. Each chapter is by a responsible author, who appears to have done his own editing. There is not a single foot-note by Mr. Powell. Indeed, it is rather surprising that a Pennsylvanian should undertake to give to the world a book about a section of the country with which he is not familiar, and concern-